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Abstract: This article describes six common challenges of design, incentives, and 
governance that arise in establishing platform businesses. It also proposes solutions. It 
considers, for example, how to open a platform to decentralized innovation yet still earn a 
return; how to incorporate best-of-breed innovations from different sources while avoiding 
problems of multi-party hold-up; and how to encourage sources of good ideas to 
contribute those ideas despite the risk of losing them to owners of indispensible 
complements. We express these issues and solutions as a reduced set of tradeoffs useful 
for managing information and technology property. 
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nformation intensive, platform businesses account for an increasing share 
of the global economy. They also account for considerable innovation. 
The multi-party nature of platform ecosystems, however, implies that 
businesses must organize for decentralized innovation. In platform 
industries, even the biggest firms can no longer innovate alone. GAWER 
(2009) provides a useful definition:   
"Industry platforms are products, services or technologies that are 
developed by one or several firms, and which serve as foundations 
upon which other firms can build complementary products, services or 
technologies." 
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When describing platform businesses, we adopt the nomenclature 
introduced in EISENMANN, PARKER & VAN ALSTYNE (2009) and 
reproduce the figure below that shows the relationships in a platform-
mediated network. Platform sponsors are responsible for the design and 
evolution of the platform system. Platform providers (who may also be 
sponsors) interact directly with platform users. Supply side users are the 
application developers who build on top of the core platform to extend its 
functionality. Demand side users consume platform and application 
resources, and interact with application providers via the platform (PARKER 
& VAN ALSTYNE, 2005; EISENMANN, PARKER & VAN ALSTYNE, 2006).
Figure 1 - Elements of a platform business network 
Our purpose below is to describe six common challenges of design, 
incentives, and governance that arise in the establishment and management 
of platform businesses. These issues are developed from the perspective of 
a platform sponsor that holds platform intellectual property rights and can set 
the rules of engagement for participants in a platform ecosystem. In 
particular, we are interested in how the platform sponsor sets rules for 
application developers that wish to participate in the platform business. In 
addition, we compare the most commonly used software copyright licenses G. PARKER & M. VAN ALSTYNE  19 
and suggest that there might be alternate licenses that promote higher rates 
of innovation. 
Increasingly, industries that were once characterized by slow rates of 
innovation are being restructured in ways that increase their "clockspeed" 
(FINE, 1998). For example, although there have been major improvements 
in electric power transmission and distribution technologies, the basic 
elements of the electric power system have remained unchanged since the 
days of Thomas Edison. That is about to change as utilities prepare to 
introduce a "Smart Grid" made up of new "applications" that promise 
improved real-time price response systems, more efficient delivery 
mechanisms, the integration of intermittent resources into distributed 
generation, increased options for energy-use management, and improved 
robustness to natural events such as hurricanes and ice storms. As a result, 
a once slowing-changing industry is about to undergo a rapid increase in 
rates of innovation.  
To foster higher rates of innovation, the rules governing access and 
intellectual property must be carefully analyzed, designed, and enforced. 
This involves designing incentives for partners to participate and for partners 
to add value (BOUDREAU & HAGIU, 2009). Often, layers of innovation 
become part of the common platform available to users upon which others 
can further build; the process of placing innovations into the common 
platform is one of the central tasks facing a platform sponsor. Platforms are 
most likely to bundle application layers when similar features are provided by 
multiple developers and pricing power for any supplier is eroding. At this 
point, demand side users are faced with a coordination challenge that the 
platform can solve by folding these applications into the core while 
developers need to transition to more profitable applications 1. Importantly, 
for platform sponsors to properly coordinate the developer community, they 
must have long lived propery rights that span multiple generations of 
developer applications. In Challenge 5 on free riding, we provide an explicit 
argument for how developers can be better off when a long-lived platform 
sponsor coordinates the ecosystem even when the sponsor forces the 
developers' applications into the common platform. 
A platform's decision to bundle portions of an application into the 
common platform has an effect similar to forcing a developer to release code 
1 We thank Guido Jouret of CISCO for extensive conversations explaining the conditions under 
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into the open domain. In both cases, pricing power is reduced or eliminated, 
although competition also erodes pricing power for any particular application. 
Platforms will wish to avoid deterring for-profit developers who generally 
wish to keep their particular layer closed. However, sponsors that delay 
moving application features into the core platform can stagnate and become 
less appealing to demand side users. 
Figure 2 presents a graphical view of a platform system that allows for 
functionality to be extended through complementary applications. For a 
product or service to have platform potential, it must first perform a useful 
function and it must second allow unaffiliated parties to extend it in 
unanticipated ways (GAWER & CUSUMANO, 2002; BOUDREAU, 2008). 
The original iPod, offering nothing more than MP3 play, had limited 
functionality and extensibility and offered no developer access. In contrast, 
the iPhone, with color video, phone service, camera, wireless access, music 
play, and geolocation, was highly extensible and, eventually, offered 
developer access. 
Figure 2 - Platform value can increase as 3
rd party developers add applications. Over 
time, platform merges common features across applications into new platform layers 
Other examples include process swapping (e.g. an operating system 
extended by applications), routing (e.g. telecomm-unications switching 
extended by call blocking) and hosting (e.g. software as a service extended 
by new customer programs). Many platform sponsors also provide 
applications (such as the Microsoft Windows platform and Word application) G. PARKER & M. VAN ALSTYNE  21 
and may choose to leave these applications out of the core platform, even 
over multiple generatations, as a way to price discriminate across 
applications and the platform. In our examples, we focus primarily on 
information and software, but we believe platform business models extend 
widely across traditional industries as network strategies become more 
widely adopted. Earlier work shows that leading firms have prospered by 
maintaining tight control over access to their platforms while others have 
prospered by opening access to third party contributions. Such distinct 
strategies suggest there are subtle answers to the question of how platforms 
should interact with supply side developers (WEST, 2003; EISENMANN, 
PARKER, & VAN ALSTYNE, 2006; 2009).  
  Intellectual property and innovation debate 
Previous works on intellectual property have focused largely on 
standards and sequential innovation and have fallen largely into two camps - 
those favoring strong protection and those favoring weak. On one hand, 
economists and lawyers argue that incentives matter for innovation 
(LANDES & POSNER, 2003; WAGNER, 2003). Intellectual property law 
embodies this principle, granting temporary monopolies to authors and 
inventors as a stimulus to innovation. If too-strong property rights are truly 
bad for business, firms can simply choose not to exercise them (MERGES, 
2008). On the other hand, recent developments have challenged the idea 
that proprietary systems call forth the most innovation. The challenge 
appears among other economists who assert that openness permits access 
and growth (SHAPIRO & VARIAN, 1999). Value also comes not from 
protection but from technological lead time (BESSEN & MASKIN, 
forthcoming). The challenge appears in another form among Free Software 
proponents, who argue for openness as a right, and among Open Source 
Software proponents, who argue for value created by peer review, reuse and 
unfettered redistribution (RAYMOND, 1999; DAVID, 2004). Once a property 
rights regime is established, firms must then grapple with the degree to 
which they should foster or limit competition among developers. Too much 
competition (such that oligopoly pricing power is eroded) implies that 
developers will stay away  2. Even open source developers can avoid 
2 The number of firms necessary to erode profit margins is dependent upon many factors 
including the cost structures of each firm, the size of the total market, and the degree of 
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tackling problems for which they perceive too little credit (RAYMOND, 1999). 
But, too little competition implies disinterest, lack of critical mass, and a less 
vibrant platform. Below, we organize a handful of key papers in the literature 
by whether they argue for open or closed systems and the degree to which 
they argue that competition versus monopoly promotes innovation. 
Table 1 - Intellectual property debate 
Closed is better  Free / Open is better 
Long but narrow patents (GILBERT & 
SHAPIRO, 1990) 
Fundamental right of access (STALLMAN, 
1992)
Infinitely renewable (LANDES & POSNER, 
2003), long duration (WAGNER, 2003), or 
strong property rights (MERGES, 2008) 
Collective production / Open science 
(BENKLER, 2002; DAVID, 2004) 
Sequential innovation (GREEN & 
SCOTCHMER, 1995; CHANG, 1995) 
Tragedy of the "AntiCommons" (HELLER & 
EISENBERG, 1998) 
Table 2 - Innovation debate 
Monopoly better promotes innovation  Competition better promotes innovation 
"To promote progress in science and the 
useful arts", U.S. Constitution 
No double marginalization (SPENGLER, 1950; 
MOTTA, 2004) 
Competition reduces incentives to enter 
markets (SALOP, 1977; DIXIT & STIGLITZ, 
1977)
Innovation occurs to "escape" competition 
(AGHION et al., 2005). Imitation spurs 
innovation (BESSEN & MASKIN, forthcoming) 
We note two key points about the literature in Tables 1 and 2 3. First, 
these papers are not all clear about the distinction between open access to a 
standard versus having the right to participate in defining that standard. In 
describing platform markets, GAWER & HENDERSON (2007) and GAWER 
& CUSUMANO (2008), emphasize that control rights are multi-layered. 
Openness is not all-or-nothing but has many shades of grey (WEST, 2006). 
In addition, most of the papers in Tables 1 and 2 do not distinguish between 
standards and platforms. The latter exhibit architectural control points where 
decisions regarding the grant of control rights to others must be made. 
These decisions can precipitate or preclude third party development. 
Platform sponsors must plan these multi-layered control rights, when to open 
parts of the platform, and when to fold parts of applications into new platform 
layers.
3 We thank Annabelle Gawer for pointing out the need to clarify how the intellectual property 
and innovation literatures differ from the platform literature. G. PARKER & M. VAN ALSTYNE  23 
  Common license access properties 
Before describing our six challenges in platform design, incentives, and 
governance, we first list several of the licenses that are observed in the 
software domain to make some general comments about their properties. 
Below, we reproduce the license categorization from an internal Microsoft 
memorandum, the Halloween Document (VALLOPPILLIL, 1998). This table 
arranges licenses from the most restrictive end user license agreement 
(EULA) to licenses that force immediate disclosure of all derivative work 
(Linux/GNU). 
The arrangement of licenses in terms of increasing access suggests that 
there might be a continuous representation of two key features. The first of 
these features is the degree to which the license opens the information 
asset. The second feature is the time after which a derivative innovation 
must be put into the open domain. 
Table 3 - Halloween document (VALLOPPILLIL, 1998) 
Type Free  Redist  Unlimited 
Use
Src.
Avail.
Src.
Mod.
Public
Checkin Viral
Commercial 
(EULA)
           
Trial Software  x            
Shareware  x x           
Royalty Free Binary  x x  x         
Royalty Free 
Library  x x  x  x       
Open Source (BSD)  x x  x  x x     
Open Source 
(Apache) x x  x  x x  x   
GPL-style Open 
Source
(Linux/GNU) 
x x  x  x x  x  x 
Based on the license table above, we construct Figure 3 below and map 
three common licenses along our two key dimensions: the degree of 
immediate openness for the first round of innovation, and the length of time 
before derivative works must be released into the public domain. The 
licenses we map include a standard shrinkwrap software end user license 24     No. 74, 2
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agreement (EULA), the Berkeley Standard Developer's (BSD) license, and 
the GNU Public License (GPL). Fully open source software, such as that 
released under the GPL releases everything, and requires subsequent code 
to be released immediately. In contrast, the Berkeley Standard Developer's 
(BSD) license releases everything but places no restrictions on subsequent 
disclosure. The Microsoft End User License Agreement (EULA), for 
example, does not disclose the underlying features of the software beyond 
user interfaces (disclosure after expiration of copyright, 95 years after 
publication, is effectively forever in economic terms). Interestingly, in this 
framework, many standard licenses appear as corner solutions. This 
suggests that there might be "Other" interior licenses that are socially 
superior. Such a license might be termed a flexible copyright, or meta 
license, that incorporates features of both proprietary copyright and open 
source copyleft. That is, such a license might require an intermediate degree 
of openness immediately and complete openness after an intermediate time. 
Figure 3 - Licenses mapped by platform openness and time to release derivative works 
PARKER & VAN ALSTYNE (2008) show conditions under which interior 
"Other" licenses dominate the three corner licenses along dimensions of 
platform sponsor profitability and social welfare. The key economic 
mechanisms are that opening more of the platform to subsequent rounds of 
innovation reduces immediate profit, but can create more innovation (and 
profit and social surplus) in future periods. However, as we argue below, if 
platform sponsors and developers are forced to release their innovations 
immediately, there is no profit motive. Conversely, if derivative works are G. PARKER & M. VAN ALSTYNE  25 
never released to the open domain (or are never folded into the core 
platform), then developers lose incentives to innovate in subsequent periods.  
The key argument is that there exist economic reasons why a profit-
maximizing firm would move from a strict proprietary license in the direction 
of an open source license. Conversely, there exist reasons why a welfare-
maximizing social planner would move from a strict open source license in 
the direction of a proprietary license.  
To maximize the long term amount of for-profit and free/open software, a 
platform sponsor should make available a portion of the code in order that 
third party developers can enhance and extend it. In the vernacular of the 
open source movement, many users need to "scratch an itch" and cannot 
adapt code without access to the original sources (RAYMOND, 1999; 
LERNER & TIROLE, 2002; VON HIPPEL & VON KROGH, 2003). Using 
property rights in the platform, the sponsor can then cause subsequent 
innovation to also become free/open by bundling the best features into the 
platform. The time horizon for optimal bundling balances the interests of 
ecosystem partners – long enough that partners make money but soon 
enough that newly opened features lead the platform to further evolve. This 
process of opening and bundling creates a stream of derivative work in 
which the original platform sponsor may exercise an interest. Managing that 
interest, whether for public welfare or personal profit, is the subject of the 
tradeoffs below. 
  Platform design issues 
We briefly set forth below six design challenges that arise in developing 
licenses that mix proprietary and open source elements. The goal is to 
explore the possibility that a new license might capture the best of 
proprietary incentive systems and open source free distribution with peer 
review. This idea parallels the patent system wherein a right to exclude is 
briefly conferred.  
Challenge 1:  Open source can curb developer incentives 
Issue:  While standard open source licenses do not require developers to 
license their enhancements at cost, that is their economic effect. If 26     No. 74, 2
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developers must give users both the enhanced code and the right to 
redistribute, then developers must compete with perfect zero-marginal cost 
copies of their own goods. Such markets cannot sustain positive prices 
above transactions costs on the good itself. Although developers have 
attempted business models based on indirect compensation, such as 
services, they have not sustained prices that reflect the economic value of 
their innovations (LERNER & TIROLE, 2002). For economies not based on 
gift exchange (LAKHANI & VON HIPPEL, 2003), this leads to reduced social 
welfare characterized by under-investment in innovation. 
Proposed solution:  One mechanism is to give developers pricing power 
in their enhancements by delaying the time until the right to redistribute a 
copy vests with users. This leads to declining pricing power over time as the 
free/open period approaches. The length of delay in rights to redistribute, i.e. 
a proprietary period of an enhancement, should set the area of the demand 
curve under developer price proportional to the size of investment one wants 
to call forth while also accounting for the opportunity cost of the developer's 
time. The key idea is that by allowing 3
rd party developers to maintain certain 
rights in their own enhancements, the platform sponsor can attract deeper 
and more sustained complementary investments. 
Note that the offer of a proprietary period places no obligation on the 
developer to use it. Rather it presents an option to be used at the 
developer's discretion and he or she may choose the traditional open source 
gifting role, contributing back to the common code base at time zero or at 
any time that simply recovers costs. It does, however, create an economic 
incentive for those who might wish to profit from their own innovation. 
Challenge 2:  Information asymmetry in proprietary licenses 
Issue:  For many proprietary licensing opportunities, the developer of a 
new idea may need to disclose his or her concept to the platform author in 
order to obtain both access to the source code and permission to create a 
derivative work. As owner, however, the platorm author is under no 
obligation to license and, having learned of the opportunity, may simply 
refuse to license and then exploit the opportunity without the developer. This 
is the monopsony problem in which the existence of only one possible buyer 
creates severe problems of hold-up and inefficiently modest levels of 
investment, innovation, and trade (ARROW, 1962). G. PARKER & M. VAN ALSTYNE  27 
Proposed solution: A virtue of free/open source software licensing is the 
offer of a default contract requiring no review by the platform sponsor 4. Any 
person with an idea can anonymously secure both access to source code 
and permission to enhance it without disclosing private knowledge. The 
solution is thus to offer a public default contract, available to anyone, 
provided that developers meet other reasonable terms of the license.  
Note that another version of this solution exists already in the form of 
applications program interfaces (APIs). Much proprietary code exposes APIs 
to programmers in order that developers can execute function calls on other 
software. The current proposal is to extend this proprietary model in the 
direction of open source such that subroutines can be modified and reused 
and not merely accessed or called. In addition, this also helps to resolve the 
developer suspicions of "hidden" APIs whereby platform sponsors might 
favor internal developer teams (ELZINGA, EVANS & NICHOLS, 2001). 
GAWER & HENDERSON (2007) document the extensive steps taken by 
Intel's Architecture Lab to convince developers that they would have the 
same access to new personal computer platforms as Intel's internal 
technology developers. 
Challenge 3:  Code forking and incompatibility 
Issue:  Certain licenses, notably BSD, permit code versions that are 
incompatible. This practice, known as forking, happens when developers 
create incompatible versions from a common code base. It arises particularly 
in cases where developers are allowed to keep their code separate into 
perpetuity and thus have an economic incentive. Forked code can also be 
used to fragment a platform as Microsoft once attempted with Java. In open 
source projects, teams can disagree over goals and objectives and may 
pursue independent paths. In a simple two-party example, party A may be 
unwilling to share control while party B may be unwilling to use party A's 
changes. Either action can cause a fork in the code base which can reduce 
consumer surplus via a reduction in standardization and network effects 5.
Proposed solution:  Require developers to license their enhancements 
back to the platform sponsor in order that improvements can be folded back 
into the common code base at the appropriate time. Note that developers 
4 In the law literature, this is often called a "standard form contract". 
5 Joel West provided valuable clarification on how code base forks arise. 28     No. 74, 2
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can continue to sell independently if they wish but it becomes economically 
unattractive. The sponsor should then use economic principles of bundling to 
discourage incompatible versions. Bundling features creates substantial 
barriers to entry (NALEBUFF, 2004). The key insight is that once a feature 
becomes a standard platform component, a product competing for the same 
users must offer differentiated value in order to merit paying for what would 
otherwise be redundant functionality. 
Although bundling creates barriers to competing product entry, these are 
not insurmountable. Of interest is the fact that it remains contractually 
feasible to fork the code base. In order for this forking strategy to succeed, 
however, the economic value of the new offering must be sufficiently great – 
a developer must add sufficiently valuable functionality, often as part of a 
competing bundle – that the forked alternative can survive in the market. 
This permits a radical innovation to evolve while forcing it to pass a threshold 
test of value that has not simply been contractually excluded. 
Note that the problem of versioniong also arises in the case of "dual 
licensing," the practice of offering simultaneous open and closed versions of 
the platform. The closed version is what the sponsor can charge for but the 
open version has the higher rate of potential growth from third party features. 
If the sponsor were to limit third parties from redistribution, then it forfeits the 
full benefits of open innovation. But if it does not limit redistribution, the open 
version can develop valuable new features not available in the closed 
version. The sponsor can seek to capture and sell the value of third party 
development 6 but this can also reduce developer contributions as they 
resist working for free. In contrast, if developers can charge for the value of 
their contributions, this simply restores developer pricing power as 
suggested in Challenge 1. 
Challenge 4:  Quality, Competition and value chain hold-up  
Issue:  Technology markets frequently exhibit either "component 
competition" or  "systems competition" (FARRELL, MONROE & SALONER, 
1998). In the former, an innovator can compete on the basis of specializing 
in a uniquely low cost or high value part where they have an advantage. In 
the latter, an integrator competes by offering a high value collection without 
necessarily offering the best-of-breed or lowest cost for any part. The 
6 In the law literature, such contract clauses are often called "grant backs". G. PARKER & M. VAN ALSTYNE  29 
economic consequence is that specialized providers suffer hold-up by other 
bottleneck suppliers in the value chain, while integrators suffer technological 
obsolescence and strategic defection by specialist suppliers from whom they 
purchase. The crux is that individual firms cannot perpetually provide the 
best of every part but fragmentary rights distributed among multiple 
innovators create welfare losses through multiparty bargaining (HELLER & 
EISENBERG, 1998). 
Proposed solution:  Software permits near zero marginal cost transfer of 
the enabling technology throughout a value chain via access to source code. 
A successful mechanism might therefore offer default rights to the 
community of developers after the developer of an enhancement has been 
compensated both for the costs of innovating and the opportunity cost of 
effort. This simply occurs through the termination of the proprietary period 
and the commencement of the open/free source period. The most 
successful or "best-of-breed" enhancements become part of the common 
code base while reducing economic distortions caused by multiparty 
bargaining. Termination of the proprietary period then gives every developer 
a "right to merge" the best of breed components.  
Of interest to platform sponsors is the problem of how to identify best of 
breed components. No one should assume that every contribution is worthy 
of platform association. The Atari Gaming system, for example, suffered 
significant reputation harm when, after opening to outside development, poor 
quality games flooded its market. One solution is to track the most popular 
items. Another is for the platform sponsor to invest in certifying component 
quality. NTT DoCoMo uses the limited window space on its mobile phones to 
feature a dynamic list of the most popular items. Cisco encourages broad 
development on top of its networking products but certifies only a limited 
number in order to maintain exclusivity and prevent brand deterioration. 
Challenge 5: Free riding by 3
rd party developers 
Issue:  The creation of a public good, one that is nonrival and 
nonexcludable, simultaneously introduces incentive compatibility problems 
due to free riding. In this case, a third party developer might wish to invest in 
an enhancement but also to dishonor the principle of releasing source code 
upon expiration of the proprietary period. 
Proposed solution:  The sponsor's task is to offer developers sufficient 
value in affiliating with its platform that developers choose to create a 30     No. 74, 2
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derivative work in preference to incurring the cost of developing an 
independent platform. This implies that the offer of developer profits 
collected during the proprietary period must be greater than the developer 
could earn independently, accounting for (i) the cost of independent platform 
development and (ii) the lower cost of reusing common code. 
Note that another common problem of public goods, over-grazing or the 
"tragedy of the commons" does not arise in the case of software due to zero 
marginal cost reproduction. PARKER & VAN ALSTYNE (2008) show in a 
modeling framework that there is a prisoner's dilemma in the disclosure 
game among developers (see Figure 4). The Nash equilibrium is (defect, 
defect) where defect means to keep one's innovation closed while 
benefitting from others' disclosures. Cooperate means to allow one's own 
innovation to become open after a time. Although the Nash equilibrium is for 
developers to defect, this is not the Pareto optimum (PARKER & VAN 
ALSTYNE, 2008). 
To make money, developers can individually refuse to open their 
applications even as they prefer every other developer to open theirs. Given 
a sufficiently large developer pool, however, developers are collectively 
better off submitting to a contract forcing them to open their applications at a 
future date. The reason is that subsequent output can build from a larger 
pool of initial input, leading to higher total surplus.  
Figure 4 - Prisoner's dilemma in developer disclosure game 
The platform sponsor must enforce such contracts not only for benefit of 
the platform but of the developers themselves, a role similar to that of a 
social planner. In effect, the platform sponsor's own self interest causes the 
sponsor to seek a solution to the public goods problem – namely 
underprovision of new information due to non-cooperation. This result is of 
particular importance for regulators and platform systems designers. In order 
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sponsors must have longer tenure than the developers who build upon their 
platforms.  
Finally, we note the existence of norm-based exchanges that provide 
non-contractual solutions to the free-rider problem. For example, 
FAUCHART & VON HIPPEL (2008) describe how strong cultural norms 
protect the intellectual property (recipes) of French chefs. Violations of the 
norms are punished with sanctions that include loss of status in the 
community and loss of future access to the community's resources. 
Challenge 6:  Platform sponsor rent seeking 
Issue:  If the platform sponsor maintains a key complement as 
inaccessible proprietary code, then that sponsor can potentially appropriate 
the value of future enhancements via price hikes. Once the developers' 
enhancements become part of the core platform, they are relatively free, but 
demand side users must still purchase the indispensible complement to 
receive the total value. Thus the original sponsor could act as a monopolist 
with respect to the value of the platform as well as the value the sponsor did 
not create. This is an issue for the sponsor to manage since platform supply- 
and demand-side users will both reason forward in time and will reduce 
consumption and participation if the risk of hold-up is too high. 
Proposed solution:  To encourage ex ante investment (i.e. before 
becoming sunk costs) by developers and affiliation by demand side users, 
the platform sponsor can contractually commit to forgoing real dollar price 
hikes on the version of common code acquired by developers. This provides 
some assurance that on expiration of a developer's proprietary period, the 
forward value created by the developer will not simply be expropriated by the 
sponsor. The sponsor, however, need not commit to price levels on its own 
future development. This leaves the sponsor free to continue adding value 
through innovation but, analogous to secondary markets in durable goods, 
future prices will be conditioned by the presence of an inferior substitute. 
Prices on sponsor enhancements will be proportional to the marginal value 
created rather than the growing stock of value created, which is socially 
more efficient. 32     No. 74, 2
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  Contributions 
The main contribution of this article is to seek resolution of six issues 
associated with the tension between market incentives that promote 
innovation against access freedoms that promote social welfare. In essence, 
a platform sponsor faces an innovation versus access tradeoff seen as a 
choice between fostering platform adoption and complementary investment 
versus capturing immediate profits on the platform itself. We show how such 
a sponsor benefits by using open licensing and property rights to grow an 
interest in downstream innovation. Opening a portion of a platform's code 
base can increases the rate of complementary third party investment. 
Closing downstream innovations, if only briefly, restores incentives to 
develop, as recently demonstrated by the high rates of developer 
participation in the iTunes/iPhone application store. Thus, there exist 
reasons for proprietary licenses to become more open and for free/open 
licenses to become more closed. Such hybrid models resolve problems of 
incentives, the right to fork, the right to merge, best of breed hold-up, and 
monopsony. 
A key benefit of decentralized open licensing is the offer of a default 
contract without negotiation costs. Under traditional closed licenses, a third 
party developer with a good idea must negotiate access to platform source 
material. Either through negotiation or by observing the identity of the 
developer, however, the platform sponsor might discern the idea and 
appropriate it. In practice, large firms have been accused of this by smaller 
firms (JACKSON, 1999). This risk reduces their willingness to invest or 
disclose the idea ex ante. In contrast, a free/open license with third party 
rights to redistribute requires no negotiation and avoids monopsony hold-up 
from the platform. 
In answer to the question of how to balance market incentives and 
access freedoms, we offer two clarifications. In terms of openness, choose a 
point such that the revenues lost on the free/open portion balance the net 
present value of the innovation revenue. In terms of time, the socially optimal 
protection is not arbitrarily long but neither is it arbitrarily short. Choose a 
time to bundle such that compensation for downstream developers' 
investments and opportunity costs balances the need to incorporate best of 
breed components into a common standard. This stands in contrast to 
important contributions in economics and law that argue for arbitrarily long 
and narrow or arbitrarily short and broad (GILBERT & SHAPIRO, 1990; 
KLEMPERER, 1990) or for time extensions based on investment and G. PARKER & M. VAN ALSTYNE  33 
maintenance (LANDES & POSNER, 2003; WAGNER, 2003). The difference 
is explicit consideration of later period innovation where prices limit reuse 
and decrease network effects. 
In terms of governance, we find that platform sponsors need longer term 
tenure than downstream developers expressly in order to enforce shorter 
terms until subsequent disclosure. This makes it possible to "stand on the 
shoulders of giants."  We identify a prisoner's dilemma in which profit 
motivated developers individually prefer to withhold their innovations from 
the open platform, but collectively prefer the others contribute. Disclosure 
and bundling, enforced by the sponsor, resolves problems of multi-party 
hold-up and the "tragedy of the anticommons." 
Finally, a useful contribution of our analysis is to generalize several 
different types of contracts. This permits comparison of licensing archetypes, 
ranging from fully open to fully closed, such as those based on GPL, BSD, 
APIs, and EULAs. Market participants can then ask which contract optimizes 
a given welfare criterion. The debate on how and when to open a platform is 
subtle and complex, requiring careful analysis of competing tradeoffs. This 
research articulates a balance of incentives and openness that promote both 
the genesis of feature rich new software offset by widespread distribution 
and network externality benefits from open access.  34     No. 74, 2
nd Q. 2009 
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